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Over the last several years, the after effects of several major disasters have severely 
impacted state, local, and regional critical infrastructure. Research was conducted via an 
analysis of the National Infrastructure Protection program and a case study of the State of 
New Hampshire Critical Infrastructure Program to determine to what extent the federal 
criteria for identifying federal critical infrastructure and key resources apply to state and 
local identification of critical infrastructure and key resources. The analysis of the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan and subsequent sector-specific plans indicates that 
there is no clear connection between the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and local 
government critical infrastructure and key resources protection and resiliency planning.  
Research also found that despite clear references to engaging state and local jurisdictions 
in planning, there was no evidence to support collaboration efforts between federal, state, 
and local jurisdictions. 
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, “Super Storm” 
Sandy in 2012, and the recent widespread flooding in Colorado and associated damages 
to critical infrastructure, only reinforce the need for collaboration between federal, state, 
and local government for pre-event planning, preparation, response, and recovery. 
Research conducted sought to examine the relationship between the National 
Infrastructure Protection Program and state and local critical infrastructure planning. 
Specifically, to what extent does the federal criteria for identifying federal critical 
infrastructure and key resources apply to state and local identification of critical 
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). As the first line of defense and response to 
incidents within their jurisdictions, local officials must work to identify what critical 
infrastructure exists within and more importantly, if lost, what will have an impact on the 
community’s ability to provide services.  
Research included a comprehensive analysis of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP) and all open source critical infrastructure sector-specific plans. A 
case study of the state of New Hampshire Critical Infrastructure Program was also 
included as an example of a “model program” for state governments. 
The analysis of the NIPP and subsequent sector-specific plans indicates that there 
is no clear connection between the NIPP and local government CIKR protection and 
resiliency planning. Research also concluded that, while some states have worked to 
develop CIKR plans, and do participate in the Annual Federal Data Call or the National 
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program, it is unclear on the extent of participation or 
the number of assets reported. Conversely, all 50 states and approximately 70 percent of 
the communities in the U.S. have approved hazard mitigation plans under the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program since its inception.1 
Between 2007 and 2012, FEMA awarded $1.7 billion in Hazard Mitigation Planning 
1 Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Survey of Hazard Mitigation 
Planning, 2012, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-109_Aug12.pdf, 1. 
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Grants.2 During a similar period FEMA spent over $17.3 billion on disaster relief.3 This 
data suggests that the U.S. is not committing sufficient resources towards prevention and 
mitigation of the impacts associated with natural and manmade disasters and that inaction 
related to CI protection and more importantly, resiliency planning is more costly.  
This thesis suggests three major recommendations for better alignment of federal, 
state, and local critical infrastructure planning. 
• Strengthen the relationship between federal, state, and local critical 
infrastructure planning. This can be accomplished by 1) Redefining the 
CIKR reporting process from a “top down” to an “up and down” 
information flow and 2) Implementing the goals and objectives related to 
information sharing at the state and local Levels as identified in the 
National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding.4 
• Link hazard mitigation planning with national infrastructure protection 
and resiliency planning. Each planning process focuses on a risk 
assessment strategy for assessing and identifying critical assets, networks, 
and systems. This recommendation suggests the development of a 
“hybrid” planning process incorporating key elements of hazard mitigation 
planning and the NIPP. 
• Create standard asset definitions for all CIKR sectors. Creating a standard, 
scalable consequence based criteria will provide clear guidance for 
developing CIKR lists at the federal, state and local Level. Consequence 
definitions will allow planner at all Levels to assess assets, systems, and 
networks in a uniform manner and in most cases are easier to identify. 
 
2 Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Survey of Hazard Mitigation 
Planning, 2012, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-109_Aug12.pdf. 
3 Office of Budget and Management, OMB Report on Disaster Relief Funding to the Committees on 
Appropriations and the Budget of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, 2011. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/disaster_relief_report_sept201
1.pdf. 
4 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf. 
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“Emergency Preparedness is a Team Sport”1  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Most recently, Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), signed by President 
Obama on February 12, 2013, redefined the federal approach from the current Critical 
Infrastructure Protection to Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.2 PPD-21 
states the following among three strategic imperatives: 
Refine and Clarify Functional Relationships across the Federal 
Government to Advance the National Unity of Effort to Strengthen 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
An effective national effort to strengthen critical infrastructure security 
and resilience must be guided by a national plan that identifies roles and 
responsibilities and is informed by the expertise, experience, capabilities, 
and responsibilities of the SSAs, other Federal departments and agencies 
with critical infrastructure roles, State, local, tribal and territorial entities, 
and critical infrastructure owners and operators.3 
Federal critical infrastructure protection programs pre-date PPD-21, including the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). It was in 2008 to address the national 
policy for critical infrastructure protection and key resource (CIKR) protection 
requirements set forth in Presidential Decision Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure (CI) 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (PDD-7).4 The primary goal of the NIPP is 
to:  
1Eric Whitaker, “Preparing for a Disaster,” Dictionary Quotes, July 2012, http://www.dictionary-
quotes.com/emergency-preparedness-is-a-team-sport-eric-whitaker/. 
2 White House, Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency, 
2013, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
3 Ibid. 
4 White House, Presidential Decision Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
and Protection, 2003, Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-
presidential-directive-7. 
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…build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, 
deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by 
terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our nation’s CIKR 
and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response and rapid 
recovery of CIKR in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other 
emergency.”5  
Recognizing that certain federal, state, and local assets can be critical to the continuity of 
government operations, the NIPP provides the framework for developing critical 
infrastructure protection programs for all Levels of government.  
The NIPP also states, but does not mandate, that “State and local governments are 
responsible for implementing the homeland security mission, protecting public safety and 
welfare, and ensuring the provision of essential services to communities and industries 
within their jurisdictions.”6 This suggests that state and local jurisdictions are a major 
stakeholder role in the protection of CI and the development of asset lists.  
This thesis will analyze the relationship between the federal NIPP and local 
jurisdictions, the federal methodology for defining CI, and the importance of integrating 
local officials in the development of critical infrastructure protection planning. 
Specifically, research will seek to determine how or if the federal criteria for determining 
CIKR assets can assist state and local governments in developing CIKR protection and 
resiliency plans and why this might be important. Conversely, what role do state and 
local CIKR protection plans play within the federal NIPP?  
Over the last several years the United States has experienced natural and 
manmade disasters that have severely impacted critical infrastructure. For example, in 
2005 Hurricane Katrina struck the United States Gulf Coast, virtually “collapsing all 
critical infrastructures at the same time.”7 The White House Katrina Report described the 
loss of one sector, the communications infrastructure as follows, “The complete 
devastation of this infrastructure left first responders without a reliable network to use for 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, Department 
of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf. 
6 Ibid., 21. 
7 Robert Miller, “Hurricane Katrina: Communications & Infrastructure Impacts,” in Threats at Our 
Threshold, 2012, http://astrumsat.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/KatrinaHurricaneComm.pdf. 
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coordinating emergency response.”8 The Katrina report also found that “Federal, state 
and local officials responded to Hurricane Katrina without comprehensive understanding 
of the interdependencies of the Critical Infrastructure sectors in each geographical area 
and the potential national impact of their decisions.”9  
The report further states: 
Federal, State, and local officials need an implementation plan for critical 
infrastructure and restoration that can be shared across the Federal 
government, State and local governments, and with the private sector, to 
provide them with the necessary background to make informed 
preparedness decisions with limited resources.”10 
Seven years later, Super Storm Sandy caused major damage to utility, 
transportation systems, health care facilities, water and waste water treatment facilities 
and communications systems throughout the Atlantic coastal region. Damages estimates 
are in the billions of dollars.11  The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force lists 
extensive recommendations related to infrastructure resiliency and simply states 
“examples from Sandy that illustrate the need for regional coordination of resilience 
investments were seen in many instances.”12  One recurring theme amongst the 
references is the need to engage state and local jurisdictions in the identification and 
protection of critical infrastructure assets. The incidents cited highlight the failures, 
despite the numerous references to the important role of state and local jurisdictions, of 
proactive CIKR planning at all Levels of government. Whether or not the goal of CI 
programs is protection (PPD-7) or security and resilience (PPD-21), the importance of  
 
 
8 White House, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” 2006, White House 
Archives, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html. 
9 Ibid., 61. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, “Fact Sheet: Progress to Date,” August 19, 2013, U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2013/HUDNo.13-125, 
24. 
12 Ibid., 54. 
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communicating with, and including state and local jurisdictions cannot be minimized. 
Each example above stresses the importance for state and local jurisdictions to 
understand, assess and identify of CI assets.  
While CI assets affected by any of the above incidents might not have been 
specifically protected or meet the criteria for protection, it begs to question the 
effectiveness or applicability of the NIPP for state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments. The Katrina report references the interim NIPP as “providing strategic-
Level guidance for Federal, State and local entities to use in prioritizing infrastructure for 
protection.”13 However, literature does not outline a plan for implementing plans. 
The introduction of the NIPP states, “Protecting and ensuring the continuity of the 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the 
Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life.”14 With 
emphasis on the word essential, it becomes clear that CI protection and resiliency 
planning must be implemented at the state and local Level, and not just a federal effort. 
Lastly, creating standard definitions for identifying CI assets, systems, and networks will 
allow state and local governments to develop CI protection and resiliency plans that 
augment federal plans. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• To what extent could the federal criteria for identifying federal critical 
infrastructure and key resources apply to state and local identification of 
critical infrastructure and key resources? 
• Should critical infrastructure protection and resiliency planning be 
important to state and local governments?   
C. ARGUMENT 
Every community in this country has some asset(s), which, in the event of failure, 
would have a significant impact on the community or region. Assets could simply be a 
roadway, community well, reservoir, culvert pipe, or health care facility or a complex 
13 White House, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 61. 
14 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 1. 
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system, such as a water or waste water treatment facility. In Critical Infrastructure 
Protection in Homeland Security, Ted Lewis claims, “Critical infrastructure protection is 
too big for state and local governments to handle on their own” and “infrastructures are, 
for the most part, national assets.”15 While this may be true for sectors, such as 
telecommunications, energy (oil, pipeline, electricity) and some transportation assets, 
other sectors, such as potable water treatment and delivery, waste water treatment, or 
health care are located in and the responsibility for primary emergency response often 
lies with local jurisdictions.   
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research will propose to identify the importance of engaging local 
jurisdictions in the development of local definitions for CIKR assets. The merits of this 
effort and possible outcomes will be development of a CIKR flow model that 
interconnects federal, state and local definitions. This information would allow local 
governments to develop CIKR protection strategies, develop resiliency plans, better 
mitigate natural and manmade disasters and develop partnerships with the private sector. 
Furthermore, the development of state and local definitions for CIKR assets will better 
assist jurisdictions with indentifying CIKR and developing CIKR protection and 
resiliency plans.   
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The focus of this thesis centers on the applicability of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Program to local jurisdictions. Chapter II provides a summary of relevant 
literature and identifies the lack of available resources related to local critical 
infrastructure plans.  Chapter III will frame the research methodology and limitations 
used to answer the research question.  Chapter IV provides an overview and comparison 
of the current NIPP and the expected changes in the NIPP as a result of PPD-21. This 
chapter also lays out one approach to critical infrastructure protection planning through a 
case study on the state of New Hampshire Critical Infrastructure Protection Program. 
15 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2006), 10. 
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Chapter V will summarize the key findings and offer recommendations for improving 
critical infrastructure protection and resiliency programs for local jurisdictions. Lastly, 
Chapter VI will present some final thoughts on critical infrastructure protection and 
resiliency and suggest future research topics. 
F. CONCLUSION 
No matter who owns critical infrastructure assets, private companies, federal, 
state or local governments, most of these assets will have some contact with local 
jurisdictions. History has proven that many local jurisdictions are ill prepared to respond 
to, protect or assist in the recovery of these key assets and therefore must be engaged in 
the development of CIKR asset lists at all Levels of government. Furthermore, CI 
protection and resiliency planning must include an “all-hazards” approach. Of the 787 
major disaster declarations for the years 2001–2013, only two can be attributed to 
terrorism.16 Without diminishing the effects of a terrorist event, this statistic suggests that 
communities are much more likely to experience a natural disaster over a terrorist attack.  
 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Declarations,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, accessed August14, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to the 2003 State Officials Guide to Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP), there are 75,000+ state and locally owned dams and reservoirs, 700,000+ miles of 
drinking water networks, 5,800+ hospitals, over 87,000 emergency service/law 
enforcement agencies, 104 commercial nuclear power plants, 100,000+ miles of railroad 
and 5,000+ public airports and many other identified critical infrastructure located 
throughout the United States.17  While the federal government has an interest in 
protecting CI of national significance, most of the CI above is located in local 
jurisdictions. This places tremendous responsibility for protecting CI assets on state and 
local jurisdictions.    
The materials reviewed include: government reports, federal infrastructure 
protection guidance documents, state homeland security strategies, federal hazard 
mitigation planning guides and foundation reports.  
A. WHAT IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE? 
While infrastructures have always been important at the federal, state, and local 
Levels, critical infrastructure identification dates back several hundred years with the 
development of systems, such as the postal service that “sustain our way of life.”18 
However, formal definitions were not developed until the late 1990s In May 1998, 
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 63 (PPD-63), which 
defines CI as, “those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum 
operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to 
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and 
emergency services, both governmental and private.”19  This directive identified a total 
17 Council of State Governments, “State Officials Guide to Critical Infrastructure,” 2003, Council of 
State Governments http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/SOG03CriticalInfrastructure.pdf. 
18 Ibid. p.4 
19 White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 63, 1998, Federation of American Scientists, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm. 
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of 10 specific sectors with liaisons and four special topic areas.20 The directives outlined 
in PPD-63 were a result of the recommendations by the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). The PPCIP was established in 1996 was 
tasked with reporting to the president on the threats and vulnerabilities to the nation’s 
critical infrastructure.21 
The Department of Homeland Security has adopted the definition from the U.S. 
PATRIOT Act, which defines CI as “the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have 
a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or 
any combination thereof.”22  This definition amended to include intentional acts as a 
result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the definitions in PPD-63 and 
the PATRIOT Act are very similar, the definition provided in Presidential Decision 
Directive/NSC 63 was developed in the “structure for implementing CI policy and a 
limited scope in the specific sectors.”23 The United States PATRIOT Act definition 
provides for a broader spectrum of CI assets and threats and led to the expansion of the 
CI sectors to 18.  
B. FEDERAL GUIDANCE 
In 2005, the United States Department of Homeland Security released the Interim 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (INIPP) as a “starting point for developing the 
national, cross-sector plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection.”24  This plan identified 
17 CI asset sectors and assigned each sector to a “sector specific” agency. Sector specific 
agencies are responsible for identifying sectors assets, systems, and networks, 
20 Ibid. 
21 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, “Critical Foundations—Protecting 
America’s Infrastructure,” 1997, Federation of American Scientists, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pccip.pdf. 
22 Department of Homeland Security, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Department of Homeland 
Security, http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure. 
23 Council of State Governments, “State Officials Guide to Critical Infrastructure,” 5. 
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2005, 
Educase, http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/csd3754.pdf. 
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interdependencies, and for establishing risk assessment guidelines for the sector. 
Furthermore, this plan listed the following as key stakeholders and partnerships: 
Department of Homeland Security; sector-specific agencies; private sector; and state, 
local, and tribal entities.25 Goal 4 of the INIPP states, “Build Partnerships among Federal, 
State, local, tribal, international, and private sector stakeholders to implement Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Programs.”26 This would suggest that collaborative approach is 
needed to develop effective CIKR protection plans. 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan was released in 2008 to address the 
national policy for critical infrastructure protection and key resource protection (CIKR) 
requirements set forth in Presidential Decision Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (PDD-7).27 The NIPP emphasizes the 
inclusion of key partners, such as state, local, tribal and territorial governments for the 
implementation.28 The theme of specifically including state and local governments pre-
dates the Interim NIPP and the 2008 NIPP. The earliest reference found in GAO-01-323, 
Critical Infrastructure Protection states:  
The January 2000 National Plan for Information Systems Protection, the 
role of the federal government is to encourage nonfederal entities (the 
private sector and state and local governments) to organize themselves for 
efficient information exchange about cyber threats and incidents.29  
State and local jurisdictions are identified as “key stakeholders” in the effort to protecting 
Critical Infrastructure and sharing information related to threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences associated with failure of CI.  
Furthermore, the NIPP and PDD-7 identifies 18 sectors for CIKR and assigns 
each a “sector-specific agency” that is responsible for developing federal CIKR sector 
25 Ibid. p.4 
26 Ibid., 8 
27 White House, Presidential Decision Directive 7. 
28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2. 
29 General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection (GAO-01-323), 2001, Homeland 
Security Digital Library, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=197. 
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specific criteria.30 For example, the water sector has been assigned to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).31 EPA has established the criteria for determining nationally 
significant assets in the water sector in a sector-specific plan.32 Each sector-specific 
agency is then responsible for developing criteria for defining CI within the sector. For 
example, in order to meet the federal tier Levels, critical water treatment facilities are 
assessed based on: 1) population served; 2) on-site gaseous chlorine storage; 3) Economic 
loss impact; and 4) critical customers served.33  
The benefits of implementing the NIPP are listed as:34 
• Understanding of CIKR assets, systems, networks, and facilities, and other 
capabilities through industry ownership and management of a vast 
majority of CIKR in most sectors;  
• Ability to take action to reduce risk and to respond to and recover from 
incidents; 
• Ability to innovate and to provide products, services, and  technologies to 
quickly focus on mission needs; and 
• Robust relationships that are useful for sharing and protecting sensitive 
information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, and best 
practices. 
Despite numerous references to state and local partners and stated benefits, clear 
guidance for defining critical assets, networks, and systems for State and local 
jurisdictions is absent.  
C. STATE STRATEGIES FOR CIKR PROTECTION 
A limited review of readily available state homeland security strategies and state 
critical infrastructure protection programs for New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Kansas, New Mexico, Missouri, Virginia, and Pennsylvania demonstrates that 
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 1. 
31 Ibid.  
32 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-water-2010.pdf.  
33 Brandon Wales, 2009 Tier I and II Data Call (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009) (Restricted document).  
34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 10. 
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establishing and/or classifying CI at the state Level is a priority.35  The focus and scope 
of the plans vary. For example, Virginia’s program mirrors the federal plan by assigning 
sector-specific agencies who are charged with developing state criteria.36 New Mexico 
places a large emphasis on public-private collaboration but does not develop sector 
definitions. Furthermore, New Mexico suggests that the federal strategy promotes “stove-
piping” and may limit vital communications amongst the sectors.37  In addition, 
Massachusetts strategy lists a goal of “creating a common operating picture among 
homeland security and public safety stakeholders.”38 The objective related to CI is the 
“Commonwealth must be committed to providing a statewide coordinated approach to 
the identification, prioritization and protection of critical infrastructure and key resources 
and that information must be shared with important stakeholders and emergency response 
personnel.”39  
Another plan, the state of Vermont homeland security strategy, establishes one 
goal “Sustain the NIPP in Vermont” and one objective, “Implement the Vermont 
35 Kansas Division of Emergency Management, “Kansas State Homeland Security Strategy Goals and 
Objectives,” 2009, http://www.accesskansas.org/kdem/EMSWeb/pdf/library 
/State%20Strategy%20Fall%202009%20FINAL_1.pdf; D. J. O’Neil, “Statewide Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: New Mexico’s Model,” TR News, no. 211 (2000); 
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/trnews/trnews211.pdf; Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, State of Missouri’s Management of State Homeland Security Program 
and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007, 2010, Office 
of the Inspector General, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-33_Jan10.pdf; State of New 
Hampshire, Department of Safety, State of New Hampshire Homeland Security CI/KR Identification 
Report, March 10, 2008, (For official use only); E. V. Jones, V. J. Lyford, M. K. Qazi, N. J. Solan, Y. Y. 
Haimes, Virginia’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Study, 2003, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/abstractAuthors.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1242416&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexpl
ore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F8798%2F27841%2F01242416; Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Management of State Homeland Security 
Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants, 2011, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-
109_Sep11.pdf; Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Homeland Security Strategy, 2007, 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/helpus-helpyou/state-homeland-security-strategy-092307.pdf; State of 
Vermont Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Vermont Homeland Security 
Strategy, 2012, 
http://hsu.vermont.gov/sites/vhs/files/2013%20Vermont%20State%20Strategy%20FINAL%20101512.pdf. 
36 E. V. Jones et al., Virginia’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Study (2003). 
37 O’Neil, Statewide Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
38 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts Homeland Security Strategy, 6. 
39 Ibid., 12. 
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Infrastructure Protection Plan (VIPP)” related to CI protection.40 The scope of the VIPP 
is to “employ an all-hazards approach to identify and protect CIKR with statewide, 
regional or national implications that if lost or disrupted would have a significant 
detrimental impact.”41  Vermont’s infrastructure plan mirrors the NIPP by assigning 
sector specific agencies for 18 sectors. The plan defines the scope of each sector and 
identifies some assets deemed critical.42 Finally, New Hampshire does follow the federal 
strategy by assigning sector-specific agencies, but it limits the possibility of “stove-
piping” by having all sectors report back to a main CI committee. Additionally, New 
Hampshire has further developed definitions for identifying CI assets that are critical to 
the state or region.43 This can assist the state in developing CI protection plans and 
allocating grant monies for buying down risk. 
D. LOCAL CIKR DEFINITIONS 
While much of the literature reviewed acknowledges that most CI is located in 
local jurisdictions and stresses the importance of engaging local authorities, there is little 
information on the processes and/or suggested criteria for developing local CIKR 
definitions or asset lists. A 2008 DHS guide for CIKR suggests that “states, regions and 
communities may contain CIKR that are very important to the local economy and the 
safety and confidence of the population, even if they are not nationally significant.”44  
Much of the literature reviewed suggests that states are encouraged to work with local 
jurisdictions to develop CIKR protection plans. With this said the membership of the 
State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC), 
40 State of Vermont Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Vermont Homeland 
Security. 
41 State of Vermont Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Vermont 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, http://vem.vermont.gov/local_state_plans/eop.   
42 Ibid., 32–42. 
43 State of New Hampshire, Department of Safety, State of New Hampshire Homeland Security CI/KR 
Identification Report. 
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, A Guide to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
Protection at the State, Regional, Local, Tribal and Territorial Level, 2008, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_srtltt_guide.pdf. 
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established in 2007 in the implementation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
includes only six local cities or towns as of August 2011.45  
Natural hazard mitigation planning, which is mandatory for state and local 
governments to be eligible for receiving non-emergency disaster assistance, is one 
process that may be looking at CIKR assets but in the context of natural disasters and not 
terrorism. Natural hazard mitigation planning is “the process of figuring out how to 
reduce or eliminate the loss of life and property damage resulting from natural 
hazards.”46 While this type of planning does not meet the individual sector designations 
found in federal and state guidance or specifically address “human caused” disasters, this 
process does categorize “critical buildings and facilities” in five areas: 1) essential 
facilities; 2) transportation systems; 3) life-line utility systems; 4) high potential loss 
facilities; and 5) hazardous materials facilities. While these plans only address protection 
from natural hazards, leveraging the process and definitions may assist local jurisdictions 
in developing CI protection and resiliency plans. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) suggests there are numerous benefits to hazard mitigation planning:47  
• Identifying cost effective actions for risk reduction that are agreed upon by 
stakeholders and the public; 
• Focusing resources on the greatest risks and vulnerabilities; 
• Building partnerships by involving people, organizations, and businesses; 
• Increasing education and awareness of hazards and risk; 
• Communicating priorities to state and federal officials; 
• Aligning risk reduction with other community objectives. 
Communities participating in hazard mitigation planning are in fact determining 
what assets, systems, and networks are critical to the continuity of local government 
45 State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, “SLTTGCC Fact Sheet,” 
2011, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/slttgcc-factsheet-508-
2011-08-19.pdf. 
46 Federal Emergency Management Agency, State and Local Hazard Mitigation Planning—How-to 
Guide, 2001, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1880. 
47 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hazard Mitigation Planning,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, accessed September 14, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/multi-hazard-mitigation-
planning.  
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operations and will realize the benefits above. In essence, local jurisdictions are arguably 
developing CIKR protection and resiliency plans if they are participating in hazard 
mitigation planning. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The limited information available related to implementing and defining critical 
infrastructure at the local Level supports the need for further research to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Is there a need to develop definitions for assisting local 
governments to assess and identify CIKR? 
2. What value do identifying Critical Infrastructure assets provide for 
local jurisdictions? 
3. How do the federal, state and Local CIKR definitions intersect? 
In a 2005 Homeland Security Affairs article, “Potholes and Detours in the Road to 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy,” the authors suggest that “the federal 
government take greater responsibility (and control) over state and local decisions” 
related to CI.48 While this may better develop federal CI asset lists and better address 
sectors with an interstate impact, it is important to remember that all responses to natural 
and manmade disasters begin at the local Level. Local jurisdictions should have an 
interest, and a voice in how they deploy resources, both physical and financial, in the 
protection of their communities. Conversely, local jurisdictions must understand the 
importance of protecting CIKR and developing resiliency plans with less reliance on state 
and federal governments. CIKR protection is a local problem. 
48 Ted G. Lewis and Rudy Darken, “Potholes and Detours in the Road to Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Policy,” Homeland Security Affairs, 1, no. 2 (2005), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=1.2.1.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH METHOD 
1. Objective 
The purpose of this research was to conduct an analysis of the existing federal 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection Program to determine the overall 
effectiveness and applicability of this program for identifying and protecting CIKR assets 
at the state and local Level, and to make recommendations for improvement. 
Furthermore, this research performed a case study of the state of New Hampshire model 
for identifying CIKR assets at the state Level. 
2. Sample Selection 
First, as the foundation for developing CIKR protection plans, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) released the National Infrastructure Protection Plan in 2008 
to address the national policy for critical infrastructure protection and key resource 
protection (CIKR) requirements as set forth in Presidential Decision Directive 7 (PDD-
7): Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.49 PDD-7 
identifies 18 sectors for CIKR and assigns each a “sector-specific agency,” which is 
responsible for developing federal CIKR sector specific criteria. Secondly, the state of 
New Hampshire, via a subcommittee of the Governor’s Advisory Council on Emergency 
Preparedness and Security (ACEPS), has reviewed the federal criteria for identifying 
CIKR assets and has developed definitions for defining assets that are critical to the 
state.50 Lastly, an analysis of alternative community preparedness programs and state 
homeland security strategies was conducted to determine whether these methodologies 
can be applied to state and/or local CIKR protection programs. 
49 White House, Presidential Decision Directive 7. 
50 State of New Hampshire, Department of Safety, State of New Hampshire Homeland Security CI/KR 
Identification Report (restricted-access document). 
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3. Data Sources 
Research data sources included the NIPP, government reports and state homeland 
security strategies. Furthermore, data was collected via an information request to each of 
New England states’ Department of Homeland Security to gather data related to each 
state’s homeland security strategy and state-specific critical infrastructure protection 
programs. 
4. Analysis 
Analysis included a review of the strengths and weaknesses of the NIPP as it 
relates to CIKR definitions at the state and local Level. Further analysis sought to identify 
the relationships between the sample selections and to identify potential gaps in the 
applicability to state and local CIKR protection planning.  Furthermore, a case study of 
the state of New Hampshire CIKR program was performed to compare this program to 
the NIPP and the federal criteria for CIKR asset identification.  
5. Output 
Through process modeling this research sought to identify a model framework for 
developing a local CIKR protection program and defining assets that are critical to local 
jurisdictions. 
B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The analysis of relevant data included the need to review state homeland security 
strategies as the basis for data related to critical infrastructure protection planning efforts 
at the state Level. Upon searching the literature, there were a very limited number of state 
strategies available as open source documents. In an effort to maintain a manageable 
quantity of data, the New England region was selected. Additionally, research found no 
local CIKR protection planning strategies. Lastly, some data sources reviewed were 
labeled as “For Official Use Only” and therefore not open source documents. The author 
chose to purposely not include specific data related to these documents in an effort to 
maintain this thesis as an open source document.  
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IV. SUMMARY OF DATA 
A. FEDERAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PROGRAM 
This section will review the criteria for assessing and prioritizing assets, systems, 
and networks for the federal sectors-specific plans (SSP) for the sectors identified in 
PPD-21 and the applicability of these criteria to State and local jurisdictions. The 
Government Facilities Sector-Specific plan has not been included as is not available as an 
open source document. Each of the SSP’s utilizes the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan Risk Management Framework for developing their respective sectors plan.  
The Risk Management Framework lays the foundation for the steps in developing 
the sector specific plans. The key components are: setting goals and objectives; identify 
assets, systems, and networks; assess risk; prioritize assets, systems, and networks; 
implement programs; and measure effectiveness.51 
 
Figure 1.  NIPP Risk Management Framework52 
B. SETTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The NIPP states, “Achieving robust, protected, and resilient infrastructure 
requires national, state, local, and sector-specific CIKR protection visions, goals, and 
51 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 28. 
52 Ibid., 27. 
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objectives that describe the desired risk management posture.”53 Furthermore, the NIPP 
states that the risk management framework supports this goal by “enabling the 
development of the national, State, regional and sector risk profiles” and “enabling DHS, 
SSA’s, and other partners to reduce the potential consequences, threats, or vulnerabilities 
to CIKR.54 
C. IDENTIFY ASSETS, SYSTEMS, AND NETWORKS 
The Department of Homeland Security maintains an inventory of the nation’s 
CIKR assets, systems and networks.55 Each sector-specific agency is responsible for 
working with owners and operators of CI, sector coordinating councils (SCC),56 and 
other sources to develop the inventories of sector assets, systems and networks.57 The 
individual sector lists are used to populate the nation’s inventory of critical assets, 
networks, and systems. Other mechanisms described for developing CI inventories 
include: voluntary submittals; study results; ongoing reviews of high risk locations; and 
the DHS National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NICPP) data call.58  
The NCIPP data call is an annual, voluntary request to state, territorial and 
Federal CIKR partners, in which CI assets, systems or networks are “nominated” for 
inclusion in the Federal inventory. 59 According to DHS, the main goals of the NCIPP are 
to: (1) identify infrastructure critical to the nation’s public health and safety, economic, or 
national security; (2) better prioritize assets, systems, and networks so as to allow DHS to 
more efficiently allocate resources; and (3) focus planning, foster coordination, and 
53 Ibid., 28. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 29. 
56 Sector Coordinating Council has self-organized membership and should be representative of a broad 
base of owners, operators, associations, and other entities—both large and small—within a sector. U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 55. 




                                                 
support preparedness efforts for incident management, response, and restoration activities 
by developing a collaborative relationships amongst all stakeholders.60  
1. Assess Risk 
The NIPP suggests that CIKR sectors assess risk in the context of consequence, 
vulnerability, and threat. 
 Risk = Consequence x Vulnerability x Threat  
• Consequence can be viewed as the overall effects of an incident. 61 
Typical examples can include loss of life or injuries, property loss, fear 
instilled in a population, or impact to government operations.  
• Vulnerability can be defined as a weakness that could result in the success 
of any of the above consequences.   
• Threat is often the most difficult to determine but can be defined as 
“natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or 
indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the 
environment, and/or property.” 62   
Examples of threat can be specific intelligence related to an attack on a community or 
infrastructure or the forecast of a severe weather event to impact a community. 
2. Prioritize Assets, Systems, and Networks 
This process “involves aggregating, combining, and analyzing risk assessment 
results to determine which assets, systems, networks, sectors, or combinations of these 
face the highest risk so that risk management priorities can be established.”63 The NCIPP 
has developed criteria to prioritize high-risk federal assets, systems or networks as either 
Level 1 or Level 2 based on consequence in four areas: fatalities, economic loss, mass 
evacuation length, and degradation of national security.64  In order for an asset, system or 
network to be included on the Level 1 or 2 lists it must meet two of the four consequence 
60 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS List of Priority Assets 
Needs to Be Validated and Reported to Congress (GA0-13-296), 2013, Government Accountability Office, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653300.pdf. 
61 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 32. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 40. 
64 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 4. 
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thresholds.65 This process is somewhat subjective in how assets are placed on the federal 
CI list. The consequence thresholds in the federal data call are labeled “For Official Use 
Only” (FOUO) and will not be included in this thesis unless they have been included in 
open-source sector specific plans. The NCIPP also identifies Level 3 for sector specific 
CIKR lists and Level 4 for state and territory CIKR lists. The sector and states lists are 
used to identify CIKR, which are important to the sector or state but do not meet Levels 1 
or 2 criteria.66  
 
Figure 2.  DHS List of Lists67 
 
65 Ibid., 14. 
66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Food and Agriculture Sector Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-food-ag-2010.pdf, 27. 
67 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Communications Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-communications-2010.pdf, 
39. 
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D. IMPLEMENT PROTECTIVE PROGRAMS AND RESILIENCY 
STRATEGIES 
Protective programs and resiliency strategies are designed to reduce risk by: 
preventing, deterring, or mitigating threat; reducing vulnerabilities and minimizing 
consequences. The NIPP risk management framework focuses on efficient allocation of 
resources.68 According to the NIPP, “effective protective programs and resiliency 
strategies must be comprehensive, coordinated, cost effective, and risk informed.”69 
Programs should not only include physical security, but the cyber and human related 
elements of CIKR.  Protective strategies can include: “implementing operational changes; 
physical protection; equipment hardening; cyber security; system resiliency; backup 
communications; response plans, training; and security upgrades.”70 Due to complex and 
geographically distributed assets, systems and networks, a collaborative program must 
include participation from CIKR owners and operators: state, local and tribal authorities; 
federal agencies and sector-specific agencies.71 Cost-effective programs and strategies 
focus “actions that offer the greatest mitigation of risk per expenditure.”72  Risk-informed 
programs should attempt to mitigate of risk by limiting consequence. Consequence 
reduction can be accomplished by reducing loss, reducing vulnerability, and/or reducing 
threats.73 
1. Measuring Effectiveness 
Performance metrics are used to determine or evaluate the overall effectiveness of 
programs. The NIPP outlines metric types and progress indicators. Two metric types, 
output and descriptive data are suggested to evaluate programs. Output (or process) data 
are used “to determine whether specific activities were performed, track progress of 




72 Ibid, 44. 
73 Ibid. 
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tasks, or report the output of a process.”74 Descriptive data are “used to understand sector 
resources and activities.”75 Metric progress indicators “utilize sector priorities to monitor 
sector metrics and data.”76 Any or all of these measures will help to determine resource 
allocation and for the development of investment strategies. 
E. FEDERAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLANS 
The following section briefly describes the scope of each sector, the strategy for 
develop sector-specific asset, system, and network lists and the methodology each sector 
identifies for collaborating with state and local partners. The criteria utilized varies 
widely from clear, concise consequence based as in the water sector to the reliance on 
owners and operators of CIKR or subject matter experts. 
1. Chemical Sector 
The chemical sector represents a “$689 billion business of chemistry” that can be 
divided into five areas: (1) basic chemistry—raw materials used in the manufacture or 
processes of products, (2) specialty chemicals—products produced in lower volumes 
used as the primary ingredient or as a processing aid in the manufacture of products, (3) 
agricultural chemicals—used primarily by farmers as fertilizer or crop protection, (4) 
pharmaceuticals—includes prescription and over the counter drugs and biotechnology, 
and (5) consumer products—packaged goods including, soap, detergents, hair and skin 
care products, cosmetics, and perfume.77 
The primary method for collecting sector CIKR high-risk data is through the 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulatory program. CFATS 
requires operators of high risk chemical facility to perform security assessments identify 
vulnerabilities, and develop security plans.78 The Chemical Sector-Specific Plan has 
74 Ibid., 47. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-chemical-2010.pdf, 99–100. 
78 Ibid., 38. 
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developed the following criteria for identifying Level 1 and Level 2 CIKR based on the 
criteria developed by the NCIPP (see Table 1). 
 
NCIPP Level 1 NCIPP Level 2 
Those CIKR that, if disrupted, could result in at least 
two of the following consequences: 
Those CIKR that, if disrupted, could result in at 
least two of the following consequences: 
1. Greater than 5,000 prompt fatalities. 
2. Greater than $75 billion in first-year economic 
consequences. 
3. Mass evacuations with a prolonged absence of 
greater than 3 months. 
4. Severe degradation of the country’s national 
security capabilities, including intelligence and 
defense functions, but excluding military facilities.  
1. Greater than 2,500 prompt fatalities. 
2. Greater than $25 billion in first-year economic 
consequences. 
3. Mass evacuations with a prolonged absence of 
greater than 1 month. 
4. Severe degradation of the country’s national 
security capabilities, including intelligence and  
Table 1.   Criteria for NCIPP Level 1 and Level 2 CIKR79 
Throughout the plan the role of state governments is emphasized. Specifically, the 
sector utilizes the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council 
(SLTTGCC) “to engage State representatives and maintains particularly focused dialogue 
with States regulating the security of chemical facilities in their jurisdiction.”80 The plan 
emphasizes the role of state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities as being critical to CI 
protection. They constitute “the front line of defense in preventing harm and providing 
response when necessary to secure the chemical sector’s critical infrastructure through 
public safety agencies such as local law enforcement, fire and rescue, emergency medical 
services, and emergency management.”81  The chemical sector plan states that this sector 
has a history of working emergency responders and regulators at the state and local 
Level, but there is no evidence cited to support the effectiveness of this effort. 
2. Commercial Facilities Sector 
The commercial facilities sector represents eight sub-sectors that have a 
significant influence on the nation’s economy. For example, “the retail industry 
79 Ibid., 39. 
80 Ibid., 19. 
81 Ibid., 25. 
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conducted more than $4.6 trillion in annual sales in 2008, has more than 1.6 million U.S. 
establishments and more than 24 million employees.”82 Additionally, the hotel industry 
generated $139.4 billion due to tourist and business travel in 2007, and commercial 
casinos paid more than $5.7 billion in direct gaming taxes in 2008.83 Subsectors include: 
• Entertainment and media—media production, print media and broadcast 
media.  
• Gaming facilities—casinos and the facilities associated with the, such as, 
hotels, conference centers, and shopping centers. 
• Lodging—non-gaming resorts, hotels and motels, hotel-based conference 
centers, and bed-and-breakfast establishments. 
• Outdoors events—amusement parks, fairs, exhibitions and parks. 
• Public assembly—convention centers, auditoriums, stadiums, arenas, 
movie theaters, cultural properties, and other assets where large numbers 
of people congregate. 
• Real estate—office buildings and office parks, apartment buildings, 
multi-family towers and condominiums, self-storage facilities, and 
property management companies. 
• Retail—enclosed malls, shopping centers, strip malls, and freestanding 
retail establishments. 
• Sports leagues—major sports leagues and federations and a sports 
broadcasting network.84 
Criteria for identifying assets, systems, and networks references the federal data 
call but does not list these in the sector-specific plan. The sector uses “consequence-
based” criteria (e.g., loss of life, economic impact, mission disruption) for developing the 
various Level 1/Level 2 asset lists.85 The primary consequence utilized is loss of life, and 
then economic impact.86 Each subsector also uses “unique features” to nominate the 
asset, system, or network for inclusion as NICPP Level 1 or Level 2 CIKR. For example, 
lodging includes the “location of the property, clientele, proximity to high-risk 
82 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-commercial-facilities-
2010.pdf, 7. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 8–9. 
85 Ibid., 36. 
86 Ibid., 37. 
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enterprises, or the iconic status of the hotel.”87 Public assembly lists the “size of the 
facility, amount of space or the occupancy load” as sector specific attributes.88 
There are numerous references to the importance of state and local government 
agencies involvement in identifying assets, systems, and networks. The plan states:  
State and local first responders, emergency managers, public health 
officials, and others involved in homeland security missions frequently 
interact with Critical Facilities Sector owners and operators in their 
jurisdictions to plan for and respond to all manner of natural and manmade 
hazards.89 
3. Communications Sector 
The communications sector is a network of complex wired, wireless, broadcast, 
cable and satellites that delivers critical communications services throughout the United 
States. Services include: telephone; cellular; radio and television; paging, data, and voice 
services; and public safety communications systems.90 
The communications sector identifies assets, systems, and networks by accepting 
nominations from any of the following:91 
• Industry—private sector owners of communications CIKR and industry 
partners that are dependent on communications for the delivery of 
services; 
• Manager/Director of the National Communications System (NCS); 
• National Communications System Committee of Principals and Council of 
Representatives—responsible for designating critical government assets or 
critical and essential operations; 
• Cross-Sector Communications Dependencies—the sector uses “the 
combined cross-sector lists of Level 1 and Level 2 CIKR to determine 
supporting communications facilities as follows”: 
 
87 Ibid., 91. 
88 Ibid., 104. 
89 Ibid., 25. 
90 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Communications Sector-Specific Plan, 12. 
91 Ibid., 38. 
 25 
                                                 
• Three or more Level 1 or Level 2 CIKR through one 
communications facility, 
• Nominated assets as designated by the sector: 
• Emergency Services—includes Public Safety Answering 
Points (PSAP) and the Emergency Alert System (EAS) as 
nominated by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), DHS Protective Security Advisors or Emergency 
Support Function Communications representatives; 
• High Capacity Assets—Major switching centers, major 
underwater cable landings or telecommunications “hotels;” 
• Automatic Inclusion—credible threats and national security 
implications are automatically included in the sector list. 
Assets, systems, and networks are prioritized using a consequence based risk 
criteria but the sector is moving to a risk-based process.92 Communications assets are 
determined to be critical based on location and the effects on end users in the incident 
impact area.93  The sector link to local jurisdictions is stated in goal three of the sector-
specific plan as “improving the sector’s national security and emergency preparedness 
(NS/EP) posture with federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector entities 
to reduce risk.”94 State and local sector relationships include: regulatory issues with state 
public utilities commissions, state and local emergency operations centers, and with first 
responders and 911 centers.95 
4. Critical Manufacturing  
The critical manufacturing sector includes several different processes that produce 
products and materials. This sector is broken into four areas: primary metals 
manufacturing; machinery manufacturing; electrical equipment manufacturing; and 
transportation and heavy equipment manufacturing.96 Sector partners include: federal 
92 Ibid., 35. 
93 Ibid., 36. 
94 Ibid., 3. 
9595 Ibid., 15. 
96 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Critical Manufacturing Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-critical-manufacturing-
2010.pdf, 9. 
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agencies, state, local, tribal and territorial governments; private sector owners and 
operators; advisory councils; and academia, research centers and think tanks.97 
Assets, systems, and networks are determined by a sector-wide risk assessment 
process with voluntary participation and input from sector partners.98 The sector plan 
states the following related to prioritizing CIKR, “The sector prioritization process will 
involve aggregating, combining, and analyzing risk-assessment results to determine 
which assets or systems face the highest risk (i.e., the most critical assets/systems).”99 
The prioritization process fundamentally first identifies critical assets and second 
determines how to provide the best and most cost-effective protective actions. 
The Critical Manufacturing Sector Plan states, “State, local, tribal and territorial 
authorities are integral to protecting our nation’s infrastructure and are the front line of 
defense for our nation’s infrastructure and serve as or in close proximity to the owners or 
operators of CIKR.”100 Some evidence of engagement of state and local emergency 
planners is the efforts of this sector to participate in local emergency planning activities, 
such as hazardous materials incident planning.  
5. Dams 
The dams sector includes dam projects, hydropower generation facilities, 
navigation locks, levees, dikes, hurricane barriers, mine tailings and other industrial 
waste impoundments, and other similar water retention and water control facilities.101  
Dams serve a number of purposes including: holding back water; impounding water to 
create a reservoir; creating spillways to control flood waters; housing equipment to 
produce electricity, and creating canals or aqueducts to move water or provide a 
navigational waterway (see Figure 3).102  
97 Ibid., 12–16. 
98 Ibid., 25–26. 
99 Ibid., 32. 
100 Ibid. 
101 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Dams Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-dams-2010.pdf, 11. 
102 Ibid., 14. 
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Figure 3.  Dam Ownership and Purpose of U.S. Dams103 
According to the Dams Sector Plan, the “Dams Sector has long-standing and 
well-established programs to assess, mitigate, and respond to the potential damages 
caused by catastrophic dam failures induced by natural hazards.”104 There are competing 
ideas related to risk assessment within the dams sector due to a lack of consensus  
 
 
103 Ibid., 16. 
104 Ibid., 52. 
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between dam owners and regulators on a risk assessment methodology.105 The sector 
currently utilizes the consequence-based top screen (CTS) methodology to prioritize 
assets based on consequences (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2.   Consequence-Based Top Screen Parameters106 
According to the Dams Sector Plan, state governments are responsible for 84 
percent of the dams on the national inventory of dams and are represented by eight state 
dam safety officials on the Sector Government Coordinating Council.  Local 
governments, public utilities, levee districts and water management districts own and 
operate dams and levees are represented largely by professional organizations.107 
105 Ibid., 53. 
106 Ibid., 45. 
107 Ibid., 29. 
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6. Defense Industrial Base Sector 
The defense industrial base (DIB) sector consists of government and private 
sector organizations that support military operations. Sector functions include: research 
and development; system design and manufacture; and the design, development, delivery 
and maintenance of military weapons systems.108  The sector focuses on “mission critical 
tasks” or the impact to defense missions to analyze and prioritize assets, systems, and 
networks. The criteria for screening priorities includes: “Single source suppliers, sole 
source or defense-unique suppliers; suppliers of dual-use products; suppliers of products 
used in multiple programs; suppliers with high requalification costs or long 




108 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Defense Industrial Base Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-defense-industrial-base-
2010.pdf, 15. 
109 Ibid., 23–24. 
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Figure 4.  Prioritization Factors, Sub Factors, and Weights110 
The sector plans states a sector goal related to risk management as to “use an all-
hazards approach to manage the risk-related dependency on critical DIB assets.”111 One 
objective related to this goal is to “improve the effectiveness of government threat 
reporting to officials, owners and operators responsible for critical defense industrial base 
assets, local law enforcement, and other first responders.”112 
110 Ibid., 36. 
111 Ibid., 19. 
112 Ibid., 19. 
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7. Emergency Services Sector 
The primary mission of the emergency services sector (ESS) is to “save lives, 
protect property and the environment, assist communities impacted by disasters and aid 
recovery during emergencies.” The ESS is made up of five disciplines: law enforcement; 
fire and emergency services; emergency management; emergency medical services; and 
public works within each discipline there are a number of specialized capabilities (e.g., 
hazardous materials, search and rescue, explosive ordinance disposal, special weapons 
and tactics and tactical operations, aviation).113 The scope of this sector includes a vast 
number of facilities, equipment and trained personnel, spread over a large, geographic 
area.114 
The ESS utilizes the “Target Capabilities List” (2007), now known as the “Core 
Capabilities List” in the National Preparedness Goal (see Table 3) to develop sector 
goals and collect information.115  ESS assets, systems, and networks consist of 
equipment and materials, vehicles, facilities and data records, access control and data 
collection systems, control systems, and strategically trained personnel, and mutual aid 
and multi-agency coordination.116 The ESS plan states, “there are three general risk 
assessment layers: (1) facility-specific or fixed assets, (2) specialized emergency services 
assets or systems, and (3) multiple systems in a region or multiple regions.”117 The plan 
does not outline a specific methodology for identifying or assessing the risk to assets, 
networks, and systems. 
 
 
113 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-emergency-services.pdf, 
11–12. 
114 Ibid., 2. 
115 Ibid., 31. 
116 Ibid., 32–33. 
117 Ibid., 45. 
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Table 3.   Core Capabilities List118 
The ESS plan identifies the importance of engaging state, local, tribal, and 
territorial governments in the development of the sector-plan and asset, system, and 
network identification. Furthermore, the plan states:  
…responsibility for incident management initially falls on State, local, 
tribal, and territorial authorities, but the majority of ESS disciplines are 
118 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 2011, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/npg.pdf. 
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organized and provided at the local Level of government by career and 
volunteer personnel from the communities.119  
This statement is consistent with the roles and responsibilities of emergency response in 
the National Incident Management System. 
8. Energy Sector 
The energy sector “consists of thousands of electricity, oil, and natural gas assets 
that are geographically dispersed and connected by systems and networks” (see Table 
4).120 Energy assets and critical infrastructure are owned by private, federal, state, and 
local entities, as well as some large industries and financial institutions.121 The scope of 
this sector is very large and each subsector has some reliance on other subsectors. For 
example, 70percent of the electrical generation is provided by fossil fuels (coal, natural 
gas or oil).122 A 2008 inventory of the electricity subsector shows that there are: 6,413 
power plants; 30,320 substations; 6,222 miles of high voltage DC transmission lines, and 
143 million customers.123  The petroleum subsector includes: 525,000 producing wells, 
150 refineries, and 1,400 petroleum terminals.124 The natural gas subsector is comprised 
of: 478,562 gas and condensate wells; over 500 gas processing plants; and approximately 
1.5 million miles of pipelines (see Table 4).125 
119 Ibid., 25. 
120 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Energy Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-energy-2010.pdf, 2. 
121 Ibid., 9 
122 Ibid., 10. 
123 Ibid., 11. 
124 Ibid., 13. 
125 Ibid., 16. 
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 Table 4.   Segments of the Energy Sector126 
The energy sector has identified six characteristics to assist in identifying assets, 
systems, and networks: physical and location features; cyber, volume or throughput, 
demands for energy, human attributes, and importance of asset to the system or 
network.127 The sector relies on the owners and operators for prioritization of assets and 
networks.  The plan states “from a grid perspective, the nation’s oil and natural gas 
pipeline systems and electricity grid are designed and operated with built-in redundancy 
to ensure a certain degree of reliability and resilience.”128    
The Energy Sector Plan lists the following goal: “clearly define critical 
infrastructure protection roles and responsibilities among all Federal, State, local, and 
private sector partners.”129  Furthermore, the plan identifies state and local governments 
as “crucial stakeholders” in providing secure and reliable energy to the nation.130 Lastly, 
126 Ibid., 9 
127 Ibid., 27. 
128 Ibid., 39. 
129 Ibid., 2. 
130 Ibid., 22. 
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the plan suggests that to successfully identify the risk to this sector and protect assets, 
systems, and networks, State and local jurisdictions must work with sector owners and 
operators to understand which facilities are critical.131  
9. Food and Agriculture Sector 
The food and agriculture sector provides food for human and animal consumption 
and includes a system of production, processing, and delivery. According to the sector 
plan, the United States has approximately 44,000 food processors, 113,000 food 
warehouses, 2.2 million farms, and over 1.2 million retail food facilities and accounts for 
about one-fifth of the nation’s economy.132   
The food and agriculture sector utilizes two mechanisms to define and identify 
critical assets within the sector: 1) the annual federal data call, and 2) the Food and 
Agriculture Sector-Criticality Assessment Tool (FAS-CAT).133 FAS-CAT was developed 
by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) to assist with the 
definition, identification, collection, verification, and updating of infrastructure 
information. The food and agriculture sector plan states the purpose of FAS-CAT is “to 
assist States in determining and documenting the most critical elements, systems, and 
subsystems in the FA Sector infrastructure at the state Level.”134 There have been some 
difficulties in collecting information: 1) the sector focuses on systems versus individual 
assets and 2) States are not uniformly reporting their list of assets.135 Assets that are 
collected are prioritized by using consequence based metrics. The following is listed as 
the criteria for prioritizing assets:  
…duration of disruption; complete destruction of facilities; relationship to 
the commodity being produced (i.e., loss of acreage of corn fields versus 
loss of entire specific product); ability of adjacent and nearby facilities to 
131 Ibid., 40. 
132 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Food and Agriculture Sector Specific Plan, 9–10. 
133 Ibid., 24. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., 26. 
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adequately compensate for the loss of production or service; financial 
markets; and CIKR supporting response and recovery.136 
The Food and Agriculture Sector Plan references state and local jurisdiction 
largely in relation to food protection and agriculture agencies that have jurisdiction over 
the food supply at the retail and wholesale Levels. State and local agencies are 
responsible for “the inspection and oversight of over one million food establishments—
restaurants and grocery stores, vending machines, cafeterias, and other outlets in health 
care facilities, schools, and correctional facilities.”137 The plan further states a goal as to:  
…work with State and local entities to ensure that they are prepared to 
respond to incidents. The sector will ensure that the combined Federal, 
State, local, and, tribal capabilities are prepared to respond quickly and 
effectively to a terrorist attack, major disease outbreak, or other disaster 
affecting the national food and agriculture infrastructure.138 
10. Finance and Banking Sector 
The banking and finance sector describes the sector as “groups of products and 
services, which are: (1) deposit, consumer credit, and payment systems; (2) credit and 
liquidity products; (3) investment products; and (4) risk-transfer products (including 
insurance).”139 The financial services sector includes “more than 18,800 federally insured 
depository institutions; thousands of providers of various investment products, including 
roughly 18,440 broker-dealer, investment advisers, and investment company complexes; 
and 7,948 domestic U.S. insurers.”140 
According to the Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan risk assessments are 
largely directed to address the interdependencies between this sector and others, such as 
energy, transportation, communications or information technology.141 Risk assessment is 
136 Ibid., 40. 
137 Ibid., 19. 
138 Ibid., 20. 
139 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-banking-
and-finance-2010.pdf, 1. 
140 Ibid., 8. 
141 Ibid., 16. 
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primarily based on consequences related to the sectors ability to operate efficiently and 
the impact on public confidence in the financial system.142 The plan does not adequately 
define “public confidence” or state how this can be measured. Assets are prioritized 
based on the following factors:  
…degree of dependence on the asset; presence or absence of alternative 
suppliers; public need for the services; potential impact of a disruption to 
the financial system; potential impacts on the economy through the 
cascading disruption of other CIKR; and trends and specific information in 
threat analysis.143 
The Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan promotes collaboration through 
“regional coalitions to build relationships and share information among financial 
institutions and first responders, emergency management personnel, and officials at the 
local Level.” 144 However, the plan does not define the make-up of these coalitions. The 
role of the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC) is to 
“promote information sharing among and between the Federal, State, local, and tribal 
authorities, as well as the private sector.”145 In addition the role of the Treasury 
Department is to “protective response planning exercises designed to protect CIKR, and 
to create a response plan that incorporates State, local, and tribal law enforcement; and 
Enhancing communication and coordination across the sector.”146 
11. Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
The health care subsector encompasses mostly private owned and operated 
organizations that deliver healthcare goods and services. The United States Department 
of Health and Human Services estimates that this subsector represents 16.2 percent or 
$2.2 trillion of the nation’s gross domestic product in 2007.147 The public health 
142 Ibid., 12. 
143 Ibid., 24. 
144 Ibid., 1. 
145 Ibid., 13. 
146 Ibid., 12. 
147 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Health Care and Public Health Sector-Specific Plan, 
2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-healthcare-and-
public-health-2010.pdf, 9. 
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subsector includes federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government entities that deals 
with the health of the population and has a role in large-scale disaster preparedness (see 
Table 5).148 
 
Table 5.   Healthcare and Public Health Statistics149 
The healthcare and public health sector utilizes the Risk Assessment Work Group 
(RAWG), a group of sector wide experts, to develop sector criteria definitions. The 
RAWG “analyzes critical functions in the sector which, if disrupted, would lead to 
overall mission degradation and cascading consequences. The group then identifies asset 
148 Ibid.  
149 Ibid., 11. 
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types that support these critical functions and their associated attributes.”150  The RAWG 
uses the information to develop scenarios that could impact the sector or the sectors 
ability to deliver health care services.151 According to the Sector-Specific Plan, 
prioritizing of critical assets, networks, and systems has yet to be completed, but the plan 
outlines the following as the goal for accomplishing this.152 
In the broad range of healthcare and public health sector assets, systems, 
and networks that have been identified, certain infrastructure components 
would lead to the most severe consequences if compromised. After these 
components have been identified, an organization will be better equipped 
to prioritize resources and activities to protect the sector. This is the step 
for prioritizing infrastructure: Prioritize hazards and critical infrastructure 
based on probability and consequence.153 
The Healthcare and Public Health Sector-Specific Plan states that state and local 
jurisdictions are represented on the Sector Government Coordinating Council. The 
Department of Health and Human Services, as the sector lead, is responsible for 
“working through two major State and local healthcare and public health professional 
associations to establish appropriate links with State, local, and territorial public health 
entities.”154 
12. Information Technology Sector 
The information technology (IT) sector is comprised of physical assets and virtual 
systems and networks that provide “key capabilities and services” to the public and 
private sectors.155 The IT Sector-Specific Plan identifies six critical functional areas that 
affect the sector’s ability to provide IT services: incident management capabilities; 
domain name resolution services; identity management and associated trust support 
150 Ibid., 20. 
151 Ibid., 24. 
152 Ibid., 28. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 14. 
155 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Information Technology Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=7899, 1. 
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services; Internet-based content, information, and communications services; and, Internet 
routing, access, and connection services.156 
The IT sector utilizes the NIPP Risk Management Framework for identifying 
sector assets, systems, and networks but largely relies on the subject matter experts assess 
sector assets, networks, and systems.157 IT sector risk reduction and prioritization 
strategies focus on functions that would have the greatest impact on sector capabilities 





157 Ibid., 21. 
158 Ibid., 30. 
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Table 6.   IT Sector Risk Profile163 
 
163 Ibid. 26. 
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The IT Sector-Specific Plan identifies the importance of collaboration with State 
and local jurisdictions in the development of the sector plan. The plan states, “By 
working together, private and public IT Sector partners can prioritize protective 
initiatives and investments within and across sectors.”164 Collaboration will help to 
ensure efficient allocation of resources. According to the plan, states are represented 
through the National Association of Chief Information Officers and local governments 
through the SLTTGCC.165 
13. Nuclear Sector 
The nuclear sector is comprised of nuclear power plants; research, training and 
test reactors; deactivated nuclear facilities; fuel cycle facilities; nuclear materials 
transport; radioactive materials; radioactive source production and distribution facilities; 
and nuclear waste.166  The most visible assets within the sector are 104 nuclear power 
plants and 32 research and test reactors, but radioactive materials are used “tens of 
thousands” of times each day for medical, research and industrials uses (Table 7).167  
164 Ibid., 1. 
165 Ibid., 13. 
166 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector-Specific 
Plan, 2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-nuclear-
2010.pdf, 9. 
167 Ibid., 12 
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Table 7.   Nuclear Sector Taxonomy168 
The nuclear sector is heavily regulated and must comply with numerous statutory 
requirements. This makes asset, system, and network identification information readily 
available for the development of the sector plan. The sector does not require states to 
submit federal data call Level 1 or Level 2 asset information but, it does coordinate with 
168 Ibid., 13 
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state and local jurisdictions to identify, request and use nuclear CIKR information.169 
Nuclear CIKR assets, systems, and networks are prioritized based on the potential 
radiological consequences associated with an attack.170 
The Nuclear Sector-Specific Plan places a large emphasis on collaborating with 
state and local jurisdictions in the protection and resiliency of nuclear CIKR. However, as 
stated below, the relationship appears to be mostly tied to state representation and 
information sharing.171   
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) looks to the State liaison 
officers to: (1) provide the primary communications channels between the 
States and the NRC; (2) serve as the key members in the States to keep the 
governors informed on issues under NRC’s jurisdiction; and (3) provide 
the NRC with State information on particular nuclear safety, security, 
emergency, or environmental issues. 
The plan does offer some information related to emergency planning zones, which can be 
utilized by state and local jurisdictions for emergency planning to assess the potential 
consequences associated with a radioactive material release.172 
14. Transportation Systems Sector 
The transportation sector is comprised of six subsectors: aviation; freight rail; 
highway; maritime; mass transit and passenger rail; and pipelines. According to the 
sector plan, transportation is responsible for the movement, distribution, and delivery of 
billions of passengers and millions of tons of good each year (Table 8).173 
 
 
169 Ibid. pp. 43–46 
170 Ibid., 66 
171 Ibid., 34 
172 Ibid., 55 
173 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-transportation-systems-
2010.pdf, 18. 
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Aviation 
Comprised of aircraft, air traffic control systems, and 
approximately 450 U.S. commercial airports and 19,000 public 
airfields. This mode includes civil and joint-use military 
airports, helipads, short take-off and landing ports, and seaplane 
bases. 
Freight Rail 
Consists of seven major carriers, hundreds of smaller railroads, 
over 140,000 miles of active railroad, over 1.3 million freight 
cars, and roughly 20,000 locomotives. Over 12,000 trains are 
operating per day. The Department of Defense has designated 
30,000 miles of track and structure as critical to the mobilization 
and re-supply of U.S. Forces. 
Highway and Motor Carriers 
Encompasses more than four million miles of roadways and 
associated infrastructure such as, 600,000 bridges and tunnels, 
which carry vehicles including automobiles, school buses, 
motorcycles, and all types of trucks, trailers, and recreational 
vehicles. 
Maritime 
Includes a wide range of watercraft and vessels and consists of 
approximately 95,000 miles of coastline, 361 ports, more than 
10,000 miles of navigational waterways, 3.4 million square 
miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone, and intermodal landside 
connections, which allow the various modes of transportation to 
move people and goods, to, from, and on the water. 
Mass Transit and 
Passenger Rail 
Includes multiple-occupancy vehicles, such as transit buses and 
facilities, trolleybuses, monorails, heavy (subway) and light rail, 
passenger rail (including both commuter rail and long distance 
rail), automated guide-way transit, inclined planes, and cable 
cars, designed to transport customers on regional and local 
routes. 
Pipelines 
Includes vast networks of pipeline that traverse hundreds of 
thousands of miles throughout the country, pipeline city gate 
stations, distribution networks and terminals that transport and 
distribute nearly all of the Nation’s natural gas and 65 percent of 
hazardous liquids, as well as various chemicals. These pipeline 
networks are operated by over 3,000 operators. 
Table 8.   Transportation Systems Sector Modal Divisions174 
The transportation sector relies in the annual federal data call to develop a list of 
assets, systems, and networks that make up transportation CIKR. The sector utilizes 
consequence to which assets, systems, and networks are most critical, based on “hazard-




174 Ibid. 15–16. 
175 Ibid., 4. 
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using four primary parameters: intelligence and risk assessments; legislative and 
executive requirements; budget and implementation constraints; and safety and privacy 
considerations and stakeholder concerns.176 
The Transportation Sector Plan states, “State and local governments are 
responsible to manage sector protection within their jurisdictions.” Furthermore, it states, 
“local governments represent the “front lines” for first responses to incidents involving 
sector assets.” Lastly, in order to meet sector resiliency goals, state and local 
governments must assist in collecting infrastructure information.177 This places a large 
amount of responsibility on state and local partners in order to meet sector protection and 
resiliency. 
15. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector 
The water and wastewater sector has two key subsectors: water treatment, storage, 
and distribution and wastewater treatment. The water subsector includes: drinking water 
and water to meet healthcare, fire protection, and heating and cooling processes. The 
sector plan states that “there are approximately 153,000 Public Water Systems of various 
sizes and users in the United States.” The physical elements of a drinking water system 
include: water source; conveyance; raw storage; treatment; treated water storage; 
distribution system; and a monitoring system (Figure 5).178  
176 Ibid., 40–41.  
177 Ibid., 22. 
178 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Water and Wastewater Systems Sector-Specific Plan, 
2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-water-
2010.pdf, 8–9. 
 47 
                                                 
 
Figure 5.  Number of Community Systems and System Size179 
There are over 16,500 wastewater treatment systems in the U.S. that provide 
treatment of domestic sewage to over 227 million people (see Figure 6).180 Additionally, 
many systems provide treatment of waste water from industrial facilities. Failure or 
disruption of these systems can result in loss of life or significant public health and 
environmental impacts. Wastewater systems include the following physical elements: 
collection system; raw influent storage; treatment system; treated water storage; 
effluent/discharge; and monitoring system.181 
 
179 Ibid., 8. 
180 Ibid., 11. 
181 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.  Numbers of Publicly Owned Treatment Systems and System Size182 
While the sector-specific plan identifies wastewater as a subsector much of the 
plan is dedicated to identifying and assessing the water subsector.183 The water subsector 
has developed its own criteria for identifying CIKR assets, systems, and networks. This 
model includes four criteria used for assessing CIKR priority Levels: population served; 
quantity of chlorine gas stored on-site; economic impact; and critical customers 
served.184 Table 9 highlights the criteria utilized in the water sector. This model is 
scalable for use by state and local planning partners. 
182 Ibid., 10. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid., 30. 
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Table 9.   Water Sector Level Criteria185 
 
185 Ibid.  
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The Water Sector Plan indicates the role of State and local jurisdictions as 
supporting the sector’s planning, protection, and resiliency initiatives.186  Among the 
sector goals and objectives related to state and local jurisdictions are:  
• Goal 4: Increase communication, outreach and public confidence;  
• Objective 2: Enhance communication and coordination among utilities and 
federal, state, and local officials and agencies to provide information about 
threats.187  
F. KEY FINDINGS OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLANS  
Each sector-specific plan identifies some methodology and has established an all-
hazards approach for identifying assets, systems, and networks within their respective 
sector. However, the criteria utilized varies widely from clear, concise, consequence 
based, as in the water sector, to the reliance on owners and operators of CIKR or subject 
matter experts. There is no evidence that the sector plans are scalable for use at the state 
and local jurisdictional Level. This is supported in an October 2011 State, Local, Tribal, 
and Territorial Government Coordinating Council report on Northeast Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Programs. Among the major findings in the report were that:  
…the large majority of State CIP coordinators indicated a need for clearer 
guidance from U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Protection 
and Programs Directorate Office of Infrastructure Protection (NPPD/IP) 
about what constitutes a “critical” asset. Respondents reported that 
NPPD/IP has been reluctant to produce criteria apart from the guidance 
included in NCIPP.188  
The report also found that the northeast states have focused their CIKR programs on 
assessing “core lifeline sectors- water and waste water, energy, communications, 
transportation, and information systems.”189  
186 Ibid., 1. 
187 Ibid., 17. 
188 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, Final Report: Northeast 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs (Washington, DC: State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial 
Government Coordinating Council, 2011), 6. 
189 Ibid., 8. 
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Most sectors reference the annual federal data call or the National Critical 
Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP) as the established parameters for states to 
report on Level 1 and Level 2 CIKR. The NCIPP utilizes a consequence based criteria for 
identifying Level 1 and Level 2 assets.190 However, the success of the NCIPP relies on 
voluntary participation from public and private CIKR partners for populating the NCIPP 
asset list.191 Among the finding in GAO-13-296 relating to state participation on the 
NCIPP program was that “most state officials contacted reported that it is difficult to 
nominate assets to the NCIPP list using the consequence-based criteria, and two officials 
said that they are considering whether to continue to participate in the NCIPP 
process.”192 Furthermore, “Homeland security officials representing 13 of the 15 states 
told us that they believe that the nomination process is moderately difficult or very 
difficult and at least two states no longer participate due to the time and effort 
required.”193 
Numerous references in each sector plan are made to the importance of engaging 
or collaborating with local jurisdictions in CIKR planning, but there is no information 
within each sector plan to assist local identification of assets, systems and networks. 
Many sectors identify the SLTTGCC as the link between the federal sector-specific 
agencies (SSA) and state and local jurisdictions. The State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial 
Government Coordinating Council report on Northeast Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Programs cites several potential disconnects with the relationship between the federal 
SSA’s and state and local participation in CIKR planning. For example, the reports states: 
The NPPD/IP develops and deploys programs to the field under the 
assumption that each State has a robust and dedicated CIP program office. 
In reality, these small State CIP units are doing much with little, but they 
need NPPD/IP to design programs with their staff resources and associated 
capabilities in mind.194 
190 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 13. 
191 Ibid., 9 
192 Ibid., 30. 
193 Ibid. 
194 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, Final Report, 5. 
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 Furthermore it notes, “States have found it difficult to interest local government 
in sustained and systematic CIP efforts, except in situations where federal funding 
streams are attached.”195 Lastly, related to local participation the report explains: 
…local government officials interviewed by the Council indicated that 
their primary activities focus on identifying assets and conducting or 
participating in a limited number of site assessments. The primary obstacle 













195 Ibid.  
196 Ibid., 6. 
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V. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
A. PROBLEM 
The earliest references to formal critical infrastructure protection (CIP) at the 
federal Level can be found in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) issues in 
1998 by President William J. Clinton. PPD-63 states, “It has long been the policy of the 
United States to assure the continuity and viability of Critical Infrastructures.” 197  
PPD-63 states a national goal as: 
No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have achieved an 
initial operating capability and no later than five years from today (May 
22, 1998) the United States shall have achieved and shall maintain the 
ability to protect the nation’s Critical Infrastructures from intentional 
acts.198  
The guidelines for implementing this directive specifically reference state and 
local governments as follows: “close cooperation with state and local governments and 
first responders is essential for a robust and flexible infrastructure protection program. 
All critical infrastructure plans and action shall take into consideration the needs, 
activities and responsibilities of state and local governments and first responders.”199  
Research conducted of existing state homeland security strategies shows that the 
state of New Hampshire is the only state that has worked to develop a “state-specific” 
criteria for identifying CIKR. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the state 
of New Hampshire had little to no process in place to identify and evaluate the risks to 
infrastructure assets that are critical to state and/or local jurisdictions.  
197 White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 63. 
198 Ibid., 2. 
199 Ibid., 4. 
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B. SOLUTION 
1. State of New Hampshire Critical Infrastructure Protection Program 
The importance of developing a CI asset list and begin protection planning at 
other than the federal Level was identified post September 11, 2001. Representatives of 
several state agencies, led by the state of New Hampshire National Guard, were tasked by 
then Governor Jeanne Shaheen with developing a list of assets that were critical within 
the state of New Hampshire.  This processed has evolved over the last 12 years with three 
distinct efforts to identify assets that are critical to the State of New Hampshire.  
2. Version 1 
Representatives of the National Guard were tasked with developing a list of 
critical infrastructure assets and developing a methodology for assessing each assets 
criticality. This process identified 11 critical infrastructure sectors are shown in Table 
10.200 
1. Agriculture and Food • The supply chains for feed, animals, and animal products. 
• Crop production and the supply chains of seed, fertilizer, and 
other necessary related materials; and 
• The post-harvesting components of the food supply chain, 
from processing, production, and packaging through storage 
and distribution to retail sales, institutional food services and 
restaurant or home consumption. 
2. Water • Fresh water supply 
• Wastewater collection and treatment 
3. Public Health • State and local health departments 
• Hospitals 
• Health clinics 
• Mental health facilities 
• Nursing homes 
• Blood-supply facilities 
• Laboratories 
• Mortuaries 
• Pharmaceutical stockpiles 
4. Emergency Services • Fire 
• Rescue 
• Emergency Medical Service 
200 Thomas Haydon, State of New Hampshire Critical Infrastructure Categories, (internal document 
New Hampshire Advisory Council on Emergency Preparedness and Security, State of New Hampshire, 
Department of Safety, 2004). 
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• Law Enforcement 
5. Defense Industrial 
Base 
• Department of Defense installations and the private defense 
industry 
6. Telecommunications • Voice and data services 
• Public Switched Telecommunications Network (PSTN) 
• Internet 
• Physical facilities 
• Switches, cables, other equipment 
• Cellular, microwave, and satellite services. 
 
7. Energy • Electricity (Generation, transmission and distribution, and 
control and communications) 
• Oil and Gas  
o Oil - Oil production, crude oil transport, refining, 
product transport and distribution, and control and 
other external support systems. 
o Gas—Exploration and production, transmission, and 
local distribution. 
8. Transportation • Aviation 




• Trucking and bussing 
• Public mass transit 
9. Banking and Finance No specific asset references 
10. Chemical Industry 
and Hazardous 
Materials 
No specific asset references 
11. Postal and Shipping No specific asset references 
Table 10.   State of New Hampshire CI Sectors201 
The following methodology was presented as a mechanism to prioritize the assets 




                                                 
reviewed and a follow-up interview with the former State Director of Homeland Security 
suggests that this process was only utilized to evaluate select assets.203 
1.  Impact on critical category: 
Red Catastrophic—complete loss of output, production or service 
Orange Significant—66% or more loss output, production or service 
Yellow Serious—33% or more loss output, production or service 
Blue Degraded—10% - 33% loss of output, production or service 
Green No significant effect 
 
2.  Recoverability: 
Red Replacement or repair requires 1 month or longer  
Orange Replacement or repair requires 1 week to 1 month 
Yellow Replacement or repair requires 3 days to 1 week 
Blue Replacement or repair requires 1 to 3 days 
Green Same day replacement or repair 
 
3. Likelihood of being attacked: 
Red Most likely imminent 
Orange Highly likely 
Yellow Probable 
Blue Possible 
Green Not likely 
 
4.  Threat to life/safety: 
Red 250+ injured or killed 
Orange 101—250 injured or killed 
Yellow 26—100 injured or killed 
Blue 6—25 injured or killed 
Green 1—5 injured or killed 
Table 11.   State of New Hampshire CI Assessment Criteria204 
203 Christopher Pope (former State of New Hampshire Homeland Security Director), interview with 
the author, August 19, 2013. 
204 Ibid. 
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3. Version 2 
The second iteration began with the formal creation of the Director of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management position within the state Department of Safety in 
July 2006 and the implementation of the 2005 state of New Hampshire Homeland 
Security Strategy.205 This strategy included one goal and four objectives related to CIKR 
protection as follows:206  
• Goal: Protection—To achieve and sustain capabilities that enable the state 
of New Hampshire to reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or 
key resources (CIKR) in order to deter, mitigate, or neutralize catastrophic 
events including terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 
• Objective 1: Continue to develop/update a list of critical infrastructure and 
key assets in the state of New Hampshire; 
• Objective 2: Develop/update a plan to reduce vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructure and key assets in the state of New Hampshire with all 
participating jurisdictions; 
• Objective 3: Assess and determine equipment necessary to improve 
security in and around key infrastructure in the state of New Hampshire; 
• Objective 4: Develop exercises or incorporate into planned exercises for 
protection of critical infrastructure in the state of New Hampshire. 
A March 2008 NH Department of Emergency Services Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Resources (CI/KR) Preparedness Report identified over 3,000 assets that are critical 
to the state. This list was developed by interviewing 10 county sheriffs and utilizing the 
fiscal years 2007 and 2008 critical infrastructure identification criteria. The primary goal 
was to identify assets that meet the federal criteria, and it but also identified infrastructure 
important to the state of NH that did not meet the federal criteria.207 This list was 
inclusive of both hard targets, including critical transportation infrastructure, water 
treatment and storage facilities, fuel storage facilities, as well as “soft targets,” such as 
schools and shopping malls.  
205 State of New Hampshire, “Revised Statutes Annotated,” 2006, State of New Hampshire, 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/i/21-p/21-p-mrg.htm. 
206 State of New Hampshire Homeland Security Strategy, 2005 (restricted-access document). 
207 State of New Hampshire, Department of Safety, State of New Hampshire Homeland Security 
CI/KR Identification Report (restricted-access document). 
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4. Version 3 
The current program began in 2008 as a result of the state of NH Preparedness 
Report and release of the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan. This reports 
states that the state will adopt the following mission related to CIKR protection:  
To achieve and sustain capabilities that enable the State of New 
Hampshire to reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key 
resources in order to deter, mitigate, or neutralize catastrophic events 
including terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.208  
The report further listed a major goal of developing a “state-Level” criteria for 
determining critical infrastructure with an objective of making the original list more 
manageable.209 To meet this goal a critical infrastructure protection (CIP) subcommittee 
of the Governor’s Advisory Council on Emergency Preparedness and Security (ACEPS) 
was created in June, 2008.  
The CIP subcommittee was given two goals:  
1. Identify an assessment tool that NH can use to define state critical 
infrastructure and  
2. Identify criteria for defining state critical infrastructure  
The committee chose the following methodology for assessing critical 
infrastructure: 
• Utilize the 17 critical infrastructure sectors as defined in the Interim 
National Infrastructure Protection Program (NIPP)210 (later this was 
expanded to the 18 sectors as identifies in the 2009 NIPP);211 
• Add a “special events” sector for New Hampshire; 
• Assign a lead person to work on each sector; 
• Review one sector per month; 
• Review interdependencies between sectors; 
208 State of New Hampshire, Department of Safety, State of New Hampshire Preparedness Report, 
(Concord, NH: State of New Hampshire, Department of Safety, 2008), (restricted-access document).  
209 Ibid. 
210 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection. 
211 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
 60 
                                                 
• Use the federal fiscal year 2009 data call as a base guideline for CI/KR 
asset definitions and; 
• Develop an asset criterion that is quantitative and as narrow as possible.212 
As a result of the CIP committee’s work over the last three years, each of the 
definitions have been developed for each of the federal sectors resulting in the 
identification of approximately 340 critical infrastructure assets in the state of New 
Hampshire. One addition to the state of New Hampshire program was the creation an 
independent “special events” sector. A follow-up committee’s leadership met with the 
Department of Homeland Security Special Events Office and found that it was just a 
collection agency for events deemed “special” by a state or organization and lacked a 
criteria for strictly defining special events. In addition, the NH program uses DHS data 
gathering tools to develop the state criteria, but it has not adequately defined the 
implications for having events on the State list. The current list is utilized by both the 
United States Department of Homeland Security Infrastructure Protection Protective 
Security Advisor and the State of New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center to 
perform security assessments of CI/KR assets throughout the state.  
Beginning in September of 2007, the State Homeland Security Grant Program 
began allocating a portion of the required 80 percent local share towards critical 







212 State of New Hampshire ACEPS CIP Subcommittee, “Meeting Minutes,” Concord, NH, June 8, 
2008. 
213 State of New Hampshire Department of Safety, “Grants Management,” accessed August 15, 2013, 
https://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/homeland/2012/index.htm. 
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Year 80% Local Share CIP Allocation 
2007 $3,056,000 $350,000 
2008 $3,702,000 $500,000 
2009 $3,914,700 $500,000 
2010 $3,813,978 $500,000 
2011 $2,718,292 $250,000 
2012 $2,241,052 $150,000 
Totals $19,446,022.00 $2,250,000.00 
Table 12.   State of New Hampshire CI Protection Spending 2007–2012214 
There are two primary conditions that determine CIP grant eligibility for local 
jurisdictions: 1) assets must be identified on the state critical infrastructure list and 2) 
identified assets must have vulnerability assessment completed by either the state of NH 
or the Department of Homeland Security.215 
C. ANALYSIS 
The state of New Hampshire is the only state to date that has worked to develop 
“state-specific” criteria for identifying CIKR. The New Hampshire program follows the 
federal strategy by assigning sector-specific agencies, but it limits the possibility of 
“stove-piping” by having all sector subject matter experts report back to a main Critical 
Infrastructure Committee. The Critical Infrastructure Committee then makes a 
recommendation to the State of New Hampshire Governor’s Advisory Council on 
Emergency Preparedness and Security for adoption. The state of New Hampshire 
program was developed definitions for identifying CIKR assets that are critical to the 
state or region.216 This strategy can assist the state in developing CI protection plans and 
justifying the allocation of State Homeland Security Grant monies for buying down risk. 
There is little evidence in this program to indicate the engagement of local jurisdictions in 
214 State of New Hampshire Department of Safety, Grants Management Unit, request for information 
related to homeland security grant funding, August 12, 2013, via email correspondence.  
215 Ibid. 
216 State of New Hampshire, Department of Safety, State of New Hampshire Homeland Security 
CI/KR Identification Report (restricted-access document). 
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the development of Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs. As an example, as of 
August 2013, of the $2,250,000 allocated for CIKR protection only $810,809 have been 
awarded to local jurisdictions for CIKR projects. This does not include pending grant 
proposals for award under the 2011 and 2012 funding.217  Furthermore, while the 
committee set a goal to use a qualitative approach to developing asset definitions and 
lists, a review of committee minutes and asset list suggests that in at least one sector, 
agriculture and food, the asset list was largely developed in a subjective manner and 
remains incomplete as of August 2013.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The State of New Hampshire CI/KR Protection Program lays the foundation for 
identifying assets that are critical to the state and region. The program was able to meet 
the 2008 state preparedness goal of developing a “state-Level” criteria for determining 
critical infrastructure with an objective of making the original list more manageable. 
While the program has begun to assess CI/KR assets throughout the state, the program 
still needs to better engage local jurisdictions in CI/KR protection and resiliency 
planning.  
 
217 State of New Hampshire Department of Safety, Grants Management Unit, request for information 
related to homeland security grant funding, August 12, 2013, via email correspondence. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much” 
Helen Keller218 
A. CONCLUSION 
This research sought to examine the relationship between the National 
Infrastructure Protection Program and local critical infrastructure planning. Specifically, 
it looked at to what extent does the federal criteria for identifying federal critical 
infrastructure and key resources apply to state and local identification of critical 
infrastructure and key resources. As the first line of defense and response to incidents 
within their jurisdictions, local officials must work to identify what critical infrastructure 
exists within and more importantly, if lost, what will have an impact on the community’s 
ability to provide services.  
While some states have worked to develop CIKR plans and do participate in the 
annual federal data call or the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program, it is 
unclear on the extent of participation or the number of assets reported. Conversely, all 50 
states and approximately 70 percent of the communities in the U.S. have approved hazard 
mitigation plans under FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program since its inception.219 
Between 2007 and 2012, FEMA awarded 1.7 billion dollars in hazard mitigation planning 
grants.220 During a similar period, FEMA spent over 17.3 billion dollars on disaster 
relief.221 This data suggests that the U.S. is not committing sufficient resources towards 
218 Helen Keller International, “Helen Keller’s Legacy,” Helen Keller International, 
http://www.hki.org/about-helen-keller/helen-kellers-legacy/. 
219 Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Survey of Hazard 
Mitigation Planning, 2012, Office of the Inspector General, 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-109_Aug12.pdf, 1. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Office of Budget and Management, OMB Report on Disaster Relief Funding to the Committees on 




                                                 
prevention and mitigation of the impacts associated with natural and manmade disasters 
and that inaction related to CI protection and, more importantly, resiliency planning is 
more costly.  
The analysis of the NIPP and subsequent sector-specific plans indicates that there 
is no clear connection between the NIPP and local government CIKR protection and 
resiliency planning. Specifically, the federal criteria for identifying assets, systems, and 
networks is too broad in scope and provides little direction for identifying CIKR assets, 
systems, and networks at not only the federal and state Level, but also for local 
jurisdictions. It also found that despite clear references to engaging state and local 
jurisdictions in planning, there was no evidence to support collaboration efforts between 
federal, state, and local jurisdictions. This is contrary to the National Security Strategy, 
which states, “Collaboration across the government—and with our partners at the state, 
local, and tribal Levels of government, in industry, and abroad—must guide our 
actions.”222 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, “Super 
Storm” Sandy in 2012, and the recent widespread flooding in Colorado only reinforce the 
need for collaboration between federal, state, and local government for pre-event 
planning, preparation, response, and recovery. Connecting the different planning 
processes and enhancing information sharing will make the U.S. one step closer to 
closing planning silos.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are proposed to help align federal, state, and 
local critical infrastructure planning. Each recommendation proposes to identify the 
implications of just doing business as usual with current critical infrastructure protection 
and resiliency programs. The author suggests that this strategy will increase participation 
in critical infrastructure protection and resiliency planning by providing clear, scalable 
guidance for local jurisdictions without creating new planning processes.  
222 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, 2012, White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf, 14. 
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1. Strengthen the Relationship among Federal, State, and Local CIKR 
Planning 
The current federal approach to CIKR planning utilizes a “top down” 
methodology where sector-specific agencies define the parameters for their respective 
sector and “voluntarily” request asset, systems, and networks lists from states. 
Strengthening participation by both state and local jurisdictions will ensure that no CIKR 
assets, systems, and networks and key interdependencies overlooked. The second barrier 
that needs to be addressed is information sharing. There are two suggested components to 
establishing this link. 
a. Component 1 
Redefine the CIKR reporting process from a “top down” to an “up and 
down” information flow. This can help to develop necessary relationships and built on 
trust and credible information. Locals would submit CIKR lists to the state, the state 
would compare this list with state criteria and ultimately report Level 1 and Level 2 
CIKR to federal CIKR sector-specific agencies. Conversely, the federal sectors would 
share information to states and states to appropriate local jurisdictions related to critical 
assets, systems, and networks (see Figure 7). One potential barrier to the latter is the lack 




Figure 7.  CIKR Information-Sharing Relationship 
b. Component 2 
Implement the goals and objectives related to information sharing at the 
State and local Levels as identified in the National Strategy for Information Sharing and 
Safeguarding. Specifically, core principal 3—“Information Informs Decision Making,” 
which states, “National security depends on easy access to information at the Federal, 
state, and local Level.”223  In the context of critical infrastructure, this can be 
accomplished by conducting outreach and training to local officials on the Protected 
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program. This will provide local officials the 
necessary link for sharing information between private owners of CIKR and state CIKR 
program officials.  
2. Link Hazard Mitigation with National Infrastructure Protection and 
Resiliency Planning 
The process for developing hazard mitigation plans utilizes a similar methodology 
as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Each plan focuses on a risk assessment 
strategy for assessing and identifying critical assets, networks, and systems. As noted 
above, approximately 70 percent of U.S. communities and all 50 states are submitting 




                                                 
hazard mitigation plans. This recommendation suggests the development of a “hybrid” 
planning process incorporating key elements of hazard mitigation planning and the NIPP.  
This example of integration is supported in the 2009 version of FEMA’s Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide, which suggests that aligning of planning efforts, such as critical 
infrastructure identification, prioritization, and protection, national preparedness and 
planning, and continuity of operations, combined with the national incident management 
system, national response framework, and the national preparedness guidelines, 
determines how federal, state, and local agencies work to prevent, prepare, respond to 
and recover from natural and manmade disasters.224  
The benefits of this approach will be (1) greater participation by locals in 
identifying critical assets, systems, and networks and (2) less reliance on additional 
resources for completion. One key finding on the SLTTGCC Northeast Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Programs report was the lack of time and resources for CIKR 
planning.225 One potential obstacle is a lack of funding at the local Level to facilitate 
planning activities. This may be overcome by increasing pre-disaster hazard mitigation 
grant funding opportunities for local jurisdictions or expanding the use of state homeland 
security grant funds for CIKR/mitigation planning (Figure 8).  
224 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, 
and Local Government Emergency Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide, 2009, Readiness and 
Emergency Management for Schools, http://rems.ed.gov/docs/FEMA_GovernmentEmergencyPlans.pdf, 4–
2. 
225 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, Final Report. 
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Figure 8.  Relationships of the National Preparedness Initiatives to Emergency Planning226 
3. Value Proposition 
The proposed recommendation to develop standard CIKR asset definitions and 
intersecting the planning components of the NIPP and hazard mitigation planning for 
CIKR asset identification should be considered. The merits of this effort and possible 
outcomes will be development of a CIKR flow model that interconnects federal, state and 
local definitions. This information would allow local governments to develop CIKR 
protection strategies, develop resiliency plans, better mitigate natural and manmade 
disasters and develop partnerships with the private sector. With tight municipal budgets 
and a multitude of obligations competing for local official’s time, clear definitions are 
226 Ibid, 4–3. 
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necessary to build effective local CIKR protection and resiliency programs.  Lastly, 
shifting the local focus on pre-disaster mitigation and resiliency planning and an increase 
in pre-disaster grant funding may have a positive impact by reducing the reliance on 
federal disaster relief funds. The following figure highlights the use of the “eliminate-
reduce-raise-create” grid from Blue Ocean Strategies to suggest the necessary changes to 
the federal approach to critical infrastructure protection programs that will allow for 
better alignment with state and local partners.  
 
Figure 9.  Strategy Canvas227 
227 W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market 
Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2005). 
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4. Create Standard Asset Definitions for All CIKR Sectors 
The missing links in each of the above planning process are standard definitions 
for critical asset, system, and network identification. Creating a standard, scalable 
consequence based criteria will provide clear guidance for developing CIKR lists at the 
federal, state, and local Levels. Use of a consequence based criteria based on the four 
consequences outline in the NIPP: “public health and safety (i.e., loss of life and illness); 
economic (direct and indirect); psychological; and governance or mission impacts.” 228 
Consequence definitions will allow planner at all Levels to assess assets, systems, and 
networks in a uniform manner and in most cases are easier to identify. The scope of the 
definition should also be expanded to include critical nodes. Critical nodes are defined as 
the most critical components of critical infrastructure.229 The use of the other elements in 
the risk equation, threat, and vulnerability cannot be overlooked. Although threats and 
vulnerabilities can vary widely between federal, state, and local jurisdiction, guidance for 




228 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 32. 
229 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, vii. 
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